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Chapter 9
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats:
Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor
Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lAbstract
The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of how commercial
diplomats lobby for public procurement contracts. The institutional environment has
ramifications for the manner of lobbying and for the practice of commercial
diplomacy. This research brings together these streams of literature, and a conceptual
model is developed. By means of an in-depth, single-case study, investigating the
lobbying activities of EU diplomats in Indonesia, the study aimed to illustrate the
model and draw the list of lobbying activities applicable for commercial diplomats.
The findings reveal that in a weak institutional development environment, the
diplomats focus on informational lobbying and rely heavily on their networks. If the
decision-making powers are decentralized, the diplomats target more decision-
makers. If diplomats do not have an access to decision-makers then ‘voice’ lobbying is
applied. If the decision-makers are not elected, the diplomats do not engage in
constituency-building lobbying. The findings illustrate the plausibility of the
introduced conceptual model. They also suggest that domestic factors, such as
interest in the host country, priority status of the host country and historical bilateral
ties can positively influence the lobbying activities of the diplomats as well.Introduction
The role of commercial diplomats is slowly changing. The Internet epoch makes it
possible for companies to conduct their own investigations of the market char-
acteristics and opportunities in a country of interest; such gathering of intelligence
was historically one of the tasks of a commercial diplomacy unit. Nowadays, theCommercial Diplomacy and International Business: A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration
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252 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨ladded value of commercial diplomats revolves more and more around their expertise
and contacts in the host country. Especially in emerging countries where the political,
economic, legal and social environment tends to change unpredictably, companies
find themselves relying increasingly on the commercial diplomats to explain the rules
of the game to them and what channels should be used for the business start-up and
promotion.
At the same time, despite the difficulties companies might face in emerging
countries, these countries also offer a lot of opportunities for them to grow and
expand their market. The population is young and demanding the same standards the
developed countries enjoy whether it comes to, for example, mobile phones,
computers or hospitals (Egan & Ovanessoff, 2011). One of the sectors where com-
panies from developed countries can seize great opportunities is infrastructure, as in
most of the emerging countries airports, harbours, and roads, which could meet the
developed countries’ standards, are yet to be built (Wooldridge, 2010).
Because of these opportunities in these countries, public procurement becomes an
interesting subject for a closer examination. It is through public procurement that a
company can contract itself to, for example, building roads, railways, dams, or other
projects. In foreign countries, it can be challenging to get a public procurement
contract because companies might not be aware of the local rules and procedures.
Moreover, foreign companies will be disadvantaged compared to domestic companies
because they will not have proper connections which could ease the process. This is
where the commercial diplomats’ familiarity with the host market and its regulations
can play a crucial role. As one of the responsibilities of commercial diplomats is
the establishment of good relations with the authorities in the host country, they
manifest themselves as essential players that can assist a firm in acquiring a public
procurement contract and can channel the company through their networks to a
successful result.
Despite its obvious practical importance, little is known about how commercial
diplomats assist companies in successfully acquiring such contracts. One of the ways
to influence the authorities responsible for public procurement is by lobbying them.
But how do commercial diplomats lobby? How do they build their network? What
lobbying techniques are used? Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union lays down EU competence in external economic policy. Having a
framework in which the countries are obliged to work together, do European
diplomats lobby in a similar way? What determines the lobbying techniques of the
commercial diplomats? The current literature on lobbying or commercial diplomacy
does not provide for answers to these questions.
Most of the research on lobbying is done on interest groups and other non-state
actors (e.g. Ihlen & Berntzen, 2007; Miller & Harkins, 2010). Little is known about
how states themselves engage in lobbying activities (Panke, 2012). There is no
knowledge on how commercial diplomats lobby. The existing literature on lobbying
points out that the institutional setting of a country has ramifications for the
manner of how groups lobby (e.g. Eising, 2007; Hamada, 2007; Holyoke, 2009;
Lowery, 2002; Lowery, Poppelaars, & Berkhout, 2008). Kostecki and Naray (2007)
also determined that the commercial diplomats’ activities depend on the host country
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emerges:
To what extent does the institutional setting of a host country determine the lobbying
activities of European commercial diplomats in the case of public procurement contracts
in emerging countries?
Such theoretical question calls for a large-scale empirical research. However, the
current state of knowledge on the lobbying activities of commercial diplomats is
incomplete, making it difficult for such research to be conducted. Consequently, it is
necessary to explore these activities first. A single case-study design is chosen to acco-
mmodate this need. At the same time it provides for an opportunity to see whether there
is any plausible link between institutional setting and lobbying activities at all. Hence,
the aim of this research is twofold: (1) drawing a list of lobbying activities applicable
for commercial diplomats and (2) illustrating the plausibility of a link between the
concept of institutional setting and lobbying activities of commercial diplomats.
The study is presented in the following sections. The literature review section
identifies the streams of literature and ties them into a conceptual model. The section
on methodology explains how the data on lobbying activities was gathered, and how
the model is examined. The findings are presented in the results section, followed by
conclusions and a reflection on the research.Literature Review
This section identifies the streams of literature that are relevant to the central research
question. The objective is to construct a research model which will frame the concepts
and guide the research in its empirical stage. Academic databases were used to track
the literature on the basis of keywords. Backward and forward referencing was
applied to locate other sources of information. This amounted to a vast pile of
literature resources, which enabled assessment of the status quo on the subject and
revealed theoretical gaps.
In order to answer the research question, there is a need to establish (2.1.) what is
implied by commercial diplomacy. As the activities of a commercial diplomat are
uncovered, it will bring the subjects of (2.2.) public procurement contracts and
(2.3.) lobbying to the surface. (2.4.) The institutional setting will then emerge as a
possible shaping factor of the lobbying activities. (2.5.) The conceptual model will be
introduced to guide the empirical part of this research. (2.6.) At last, the propositions
about the model will be derived in conclusion.Commercial Diplomacy
Commercial diplomacy has been receiving more attention in the academic world in
the past few years (e.g. Busschers, 2011; Naray, 2008; Okano-Heijmans & Rue¨l, 2011;
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the ingredients of economic diplomacy (Buschers, 2011; Okano-Heijmans & Rue¨l,
2011; Potter, 2004; Reuvers, 2012; Rue¨l & Zuidema, 2012). While economic
diplomacy is a broad term covering different economic means available to diplomats
when seeking foreign policy goals (Haan, 2010; Muller, 2002; Okano-Heijmans,
2008), commercial diplomacy is a more specific term reflecting the support that
diplomats can offer to the business sector by facilitating specific commercial gains
through export promotion, attracting inward investment and preserving outward
investment opportunities (Kostecki & Naray, 2007; Mercier, 2007; Naray, 2008;
Potter, 2004). It is important to note that this research will use a broader
conceptualization of diplomats in order to answer the main question. It will depart
from the usual assumption that diplomats are government representatives with a
diplomatic status, and will include the local staff working in the economic department
of the embassy without diplomatic status into the definition.
Buschers (2011) presents an overview of the activities performed by the commercial
diplomats that have been outlined in the literature. The common ingredients
identified by different authors seem to be (1) the provision of intelligence, which
implies gathering and disseminating market information to the firms, (2) establish-
ing relationships with the authorities which can help companies in their search
for projects and partners, (3) promoting home country products and services via
different channels of communication and trade fairs and (4) assisting companies in
disputes.
Governments have different reasons to invest in commercial diplomacy (Naray,
2008). Although the Internet has made a lot of intelligence publicly accessible, there
are still missing markets where reliable and neutral business information can only be
accessed by the diplomats due to their special relations with the country. Sukiassyan
and Nugent (2011) argue that especially in transition economies, it is difficult for
companies to operate due to unstable and unclear market conditions. Hence, the
knowledge and experience of commercial diplomats in these countries prove to be
indispensible. Commercial diplomats contribute to strengthening the commercial ties
with the host country by establishing and maintaining a country image, which plays a
role when a domestic company is recommended to the host country business and
government. Networking opportunities and partner search which the commercial
diplomats can offer to the companies form yet another reason why commercial
diplomats are indispensable. Their ‘local knowledge is particularly useful in helping
business people to participate in trade fairs, trade displays, store promotions, social
receptions for local leaders, trade and technical symposia’ (Naray, 2008, p. 5). Large
companies rely on the important contacts that commercial diplomats can offer when
it comes to complicated markets where useful networks are essential. Commercial
diplomats are familiar with the judicial system of a host country and can assist in
conflict resolution. The preparation of business and government delegation is usually
something that commercial diplomats are responsible for. By helping the businesses,
the commercial diplomats contribute to the competitiveness of domestic economies
and export growth (Naray, 2008; Rue¨l & Zuidema, 2012). This rationale for
commercial diplomacy becomes especially relevant when considering the support
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national image counts (Naray, 2008).Public Procurement Contracts
One area in which commercial diplomacy can have special relevance is public
procurement contracting. Public procurement can be defined as the process of
‘public purchase of goods and services from the private sector’ (Weiss & Thurbon,
2006, p. 703). The outcome of such process is a ‘business arrangement between a
government agency and a private entity in which the private entity promises, in
exchange for money, to deliver certain products and services to the government
agency or to others on the government’s behalf’ (Ya Ni & Bretschneider, 2007,
p. 533). Public procurement represents ‘one of the sources of demand for
companies in sectors such as construction, health care and transport’ (Edler &
Georghiou, 2007, p.950).
The public procurement market is immense. At the end of 20th century, it
amounted to 82.3% of international trade in goods and services (Kommerskollegium,
2011). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
estimated that its members’ spending on public procurement amounts on average to
12–25% of their GDP (2011). In developing countries it amounts to 14% of their
GDP (Kommerskollegium, 2011). The OECD expects that the percentages will only
grow: due ‘to the economic downturn, many countries have launched fiscal stimulus
programmes that include a large procurement component, often related to infrastruc-
ture projects’ (OECD, 2011, p. 148). Therefore, public procurement presents lots of
opportunities for companies.
Public procurement is known to be a complex arrangement because there are many
demands the company must fulfil in order to get the contract (Rue¨l, Vehof, & Telgen,
2012). A company should take into account the different political goals and many
stakeholders’ different objectives when answering the public procurement call
(Telgen, 2007). Companies should be aware of the cultural setting of the country,
different rules and organizational procedures at the various levels that apply in public
procurement contract appointment (Telgen, 2007). Moreover, different long-term
relationships of the government with the country’s business sector should be con-
sidered (Telgen, 2007).
The need for information about these demands, different rules, and culturally and
politically sensitive intelligence which plays a role in whether a company gets the
public procurement contract or not brings the subject back to the rationale of
the existence of commercial diplomacy. One of the responsibilities of commercial
diplomats is the establishment of good relations with the authorities in the host
country. Therefore, they manifest themselves as essential players that can assist a firm
in acquiring a public procurement contract and can channel the company through
their networks to a successful result. And for that reason, the knowledge, experience
and network of commercial diplomats constitute valuable assets for the companies
striving to get the public procurement contracts.
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assist companies in their successful acquiring of such contracts. One of the ways to
influence the authorities responsible for public procurement is by lobbying them. The
current literature on commercial diplomacy has been oblivious to the lobbying
literature. The next section attempts to set this straight.Lobbying
A wealth of research has been done on lobbying. Most of it focuses on interest groups
and other non-state actors (e.g. Ihlen & Berntzen, 2007; Miller & Harkins, 2010).
Little is known about how states themselves engage in lobbying activities (Panke,
2012). And this is fundamentally different from business groups. For example, the
diplomats do not have a budget which they can use to make a donation in order to
persuade the decision-makers to assign the public procurement contract to a
particular company. A study on public procurement in the United States has shown
that companies that made political donations were more likely to receive the public
procurement contract (Hogan, Long, & Stretesky, 2010). Neither can commercial
diplomats capture the fields of sciences, civil society and the media completely due to
budget constraints (Miller & Harkins, 2010). Moreover, the usual stage where
lobbying is examined is the US congress or the EU institutions (e.g. Coen, 2007;
Mack, 2005; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2008). Another important aspect of this
stream of literature is that lobbying is usually performed to influence a policy
outcome, regulation or other legislation (e.g. Gray, 1989; Lowery, 2002). And as
public procurement competition is not about changing a policy but about who is
getting the contract, the lobbying activities will differ. Yet another stream of literature
on lobbying focuses on the personal characteristics of a lobbyist which can make
lobbying successful (McGrath, 2006; Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009; Spencer & van
Schendelen, 2002; Van Schendelen, 2002). This section attempts to distil the lobbying
aspects which are relevant for this kind of lobbying, concentrating on state actors who
do not target policy change, rules or other legislation.
Lobbying is defined as a strategic activity of providing information to legislators
(Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; McGrath, 2007), ‘contacting government officials or
elected politicians to influence their decisions on matters of interest’ (Mack, 2005,
p. 340). Ihlen and Berntzen (2007) define it as ‘influencing political decision-making
in the interest of a group by communicating with publics relevant to the political
process of a certain issue’ (p. 236). And Vining, Shapiro, and Borges (2005) define it
as ‘all attempts to communicate information to political actors’ (p. 151). Panke
(2012) defines it in a similar way: ‘lobbying is an informal pathway to influence
policies in arenas or bodies in which lobbyists themselves have no formal decision-
taking competencies’ (p. 130). The combination of these definitions results in the
following synthesis, where the concept of lobbying for this research captures all
attempts by the commercial diplomats to communicate information to host government
officials in order to influence their decision about whom to assign a public procurement
contract to.
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nature in the process of decision-making (Lowery, 2002; Svendsen, 2011) and the
great variety of ways the lobbying takes place (Lowery et al., 2008; Van Schendelen,
2012), it has empirically been shown that it does have an effect on the outcome of a
lobbied concept (e.g. Baron & Hirsch, 2012; Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, 2006;
Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, 2009; Husted, 1991; Kee, Olarreaga, & Silva,
2007; Panke, 2012; Vining et al., 2005). Lobbying plays an important role as it can
shape the decisions that are taken, make sure that a status quo prevails and influence
the attitudes of decision-makers by moulding the political agenda (Baron & Hirsch,
2012; Gawande et al., 2009; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Svendsen, 2011). The pursuit
of economic benefits is usually the reason for lobbying (Crosby & Orsini, 1996; Mack,
2005). And although this could be considered a negative motivation (Van Hulten,
2011), it does not necessarily have to be denoted that way as it is another way of
interest representation and assurance that the government officials take decisions that
are not mismatched to society’s needs (Eising, 2007; Ihlen & Berntzen, 2007; Mack,
2005; McGrath, 2005). For example, in the case of lobbying for a free-trade
agreement between countries, tariff-barrier-lifting measures or access to the foreign
market agreements, lobbying even benefits the consumers by lowering the prices
through facilitating intensified competition and thus improving welfare (Gawande
et al., 2006; Husted, 1991; Kee et al., 2007; Solis & Katada, 2007). Hence, even though
the commercial diplomats will be driven by the interest of their home countries’ firms,
the outcome of their lobbying does not necessarily harm the host country.
Lobbying involves a lot of preparation which is indispensible for success (Van
Schendelen, 2012). Different relevant documents are studied for stakeholders, their
position on the matter, and when and how they are likely to intervene, and the time
frame which is prescribed by procedures and agendas (Gray, 1989; Van Schendelen,
2012). The literature identifies several methods and techniques lobbyists can use to
best achieve their goal (Furlong & Kerwin, 2005; Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009;
Schlozman & Tierney, 1986). However, the lists of such techniques and methods are
not directly applicable to the lobbying of commercial diplomats and especially not in
the case of lobbying for public procurement contracts. This brings the matter to the
first aim of this research: the identification of lobbying techniques that are applied by
the commercial diplomats. Even though the literature does not provide such list of
techniques, it helps to identify different elements of lobbying which the commercial
diplomats have to be aware of. It will also serve as a guide in the search for lobbying
activities that commercial diplomats use. Hence, the remaining part of this section will
outline different aspects of successful lobbying which are relevant for the commercial
diplomats.
Lobbyists need to make a selection of priority projects they want to focus on, as they
have limited financial and human resources (Crosby & Orsini, 1996; Panke, 2012;
Vining et al., 2005). Domestic interests can play a role, but also the host country’s needs
are to be considered. When a lobbying group chooses a project which reflects popular
and salient matters, for example lobbying for the need to build a new public transport
system which will lessen congestion and contribute to a healthier environment, it
will have a better chance of getting through (Klu¨ver, 2010a, 2010b; Lowery, 2002).
258 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lThe notion of salience draws attention to the timing of lobbying, one of its most
vital aspects (Crosby & Orsini, 1996; Gray, 1989; Mack, 2005). A delay could result in
somebody else getting the public procurement contract, at the same time ‘lobbying an
issue before it has become salient to the decision-maker will cause it to fall on deaf
ears’ (Crosby & Orsini, 1996, p. 2). Therefore, if lobbyists want to address an issue the
public is not familiar with yet, they need to make it salient and attract attention to it.
They have to plan their actions to be timely and anticipate the trends.
Once the issue is chosen, there is a decision to be made on how to structure and
present the message (McGrath, 2007). Vining et al. (2005) identify three major
categories of lobbying argumentation. Fact and science arguments are crucial in the
fields where technical knowledge is indispensible like health and environment issues.
Economic efficiency arguments focus on the notion of maximizing social surplus,
and equity arguments have strong persuasion powers when they can be described
in terms of big losses to large groups of society. Thus, the lobbying commercial
diplomats can use their technical intelligence and present the arguments differently
depending on the matter and the goals.
The decision-makers need this technical intelligence in order to design policies and
justify the decisions that are taken (Bouwen, 2002; Crosby & Orsini, 1996). Lobbying
groups employ informational lobbying to shape the decision-makers’ opinion on the
subject (Gawande et al., 2009; Heitshusen, 2000). The lobbyists can disseminate to the
relevant decision-makers’ informational materials containing different technical data
and arguments (Gawande et al., 2009; Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011). They can provide
information about the positive and negative consequences of the decision or measure
to be taken, or even draft legislation or amendments (Heitshusen, 2000; Hojnacki &
Kimball, 1998). In this way the lobbyists can mould the point of views of decision-
makers in their favour.
Along with technical intelligence, there is a need for political intelligence in order
to accomplish successful lobbying. A lobbying group should monitor what is going on
in the relevant government ministries. It is important to meet regularly, formally and
informally with the decision-makers (Haug & Koppang, 1997; Hojnacki & Kimball,
1998; Mack, 2005). The ability to have frequent meetings with the decision-makers is
essential for successful lobbying (Hamada, 2007, Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009).
Nownes and DeAlejandro (2009) explain why organizing personal meetings and
receptions with decision-makers are so effective. It provides an opportunity to listen
as well as to speak. In this way the lobbying party can find out about the upcoming
calls for public procurement and other projects, for example. Frequent meetings allow
lobbyists to build close relationships with decision-makers. And finally, it works
because ‘government officials and their staffers like them’ (Nownes & DeAlejandro,
2009, p. 449). The level of familiarity with the decision-makers and their agenda has a
positive effect on the lobbying success (Eising, 2007; Holyoke, 2009). So if there are
ties that were historically formed due to a long bilateral relationship between the
domestic and host country, it will benefit the lobbying because the lobbying group
will know how the government works, and in turn the government will also be
familiar with it (Panke, 2012). Such networking and acquiring of an influential mass
of befriended stakeholders determine the effectiveness and efficiency of lobbying, as
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 259lobbyists can rely on their influential network when required (Mack, 2005; Van
Schendelen, 2012).
Lobbyists have to identify with whom they will cooperate, as different authors
have indicated that the ability to form a coalition is one of the most important
determinants of successful lobbying (Furlong & Kerwin, 2005; Klu¨ver, 2010a, 2010b;
Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009). And although lobbying for public procurement
signifies a singular national interest, there are possibilities to form coalitions with
domestic groups, such as businesses and associations. This is also referred to as
constituency-building lobbying, where lobbying can persuade decision-makers by
offering them the proof that the lobbyists’ demands are supported by a large group in
society or key players in the domestic industry (Haug & Koppang, 1997; Hojnacki,
1997; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Holyoke, 2009; Vining et al., 2005). Hence, the
earlier mentioned equity arguments would be effective. Collective lobbying can also
lead to economies of scale, and hence efficiency, as different groups will merge
resources to obtain the desired outcome. At the same time the lobbying group should
be aware which other countries will be lobbying and keep an eye on their activities
(Holyoke, 2003).
There are different lobbying strategies such as ‘access’ driven or ‘voice’ driven,
where the former relates to direct lobbying of a decision-maker through appointments
and meetings, and the latter relates to indirect lobbying through, for example, media
attention, campaigns and grassroots lobbying1 (Bergan, 2009; Bouwen & McCown,
2007; Vining et al., 2005). If possible the lobbyists will always try to have appoint-
ments with the decision-makers, i.e. ‘access’ lobbying. The literature shows that
influential committee members or decision-makers who are responsible for the
decision-taking will always be targeted (Eising, 2007; Heitshusen, 2000; Hojnacki &
Kimball, 1998; Holyoke, 2009; Mack, 2005). The lobbyists will also lobby their allies
or decision-makers who will be likely to favour them (Austen-Smith & Wright, 1996;
Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). When the group wants the matter to be put on political
agenda, then again they will lobby their allies, providing them with more information
tools to convince other decision-makers (Eising, 2007; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998).
When a lobbying group cannot get access to decision-makers, it will engage in
indirect lobbying — ‘voice’ lobbying. However, lobbyists can also apply indirect
lobbying when there is a need to strengthen their direct lobbying efforts. Media
lobbying is one of such indirect ways to lobby, where the lobbyists try to shape the
decision-makers’ opinion through newspaper articles or journals. When using media
for lobbying, the lobbying group should avoid too much confrontation with the
decision-makers by pointing out the flaws or suggesting that other ways different
from what the decision-makers have chosen are better. The ability to keep the ‘license
to operate’ is most important when it comes to lobbying, hence the lobbyists should
frame their information well (Ihlen & Berntzen, 2007; Van Schendelen, 2012).1Grassroots lobbying refers to the mobilization of the members of the lobby group, or the members of the
political party, to contact a policy-maker to influence the desired outcome (Bergan, 2009).
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emerges that commercial diplomats need to make a selection of priority projects to
lobby for and ensure that the projects trigger the host country’s public interest.
Commercial diplomats can structure their technical intelligence into different types of
arguments for their informational lobbying. They must acquire political intelligence,
be closely familiar with the rules, and establish networks with the influential members
of the public procurement committee and officials who are likely to back their
candidates. At the same time they should be aware of other countries lobbying
the same committees and people. Constituency building can be a powerful way to
persuade decision-makers. That is why the diplomats could choose to ally with
domestic actors as much as possible. Overall, the diplomats can engage in both
‘access’-driven (direct) and ‘voice’-driven (indirect) lobbying, depending on the access
they can get to the decision-makers.Institutional Setting
Many of the lobbying aspects depend on the political structure and institutional
setting of the country. The literature identifies that the institutional environment has
ramifications for the manner of lobbying (Eising, 2007; Hamada, 2007; Holyoke,
2009; Lowery, 2002; Lowery et al., 2008; Messer, Berkhout, & Lowery, 2010;
Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009; Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011; Vining et al., 2005).
Kostecki and Naray (2007) also determined that the commercial diplomats’ activities
depend on the host country characteristics of its institutional setting. Buschers (2011)
showed that in a less developed institutional setting, the SMEs consult commercial
diplomats more often than in more developed ones. Telgen (2007) draws attention to
the importance of the institutional setting of the host country for the public
procurement contracts. Chan, Isobe and Makino (2008) have also recognized that
businesses will behave differently in different countries depending on the institutional
structure. As a lot of authors devote attention to the institutional setting in these
streams of literature, the following section will classify different aspects of the
institutional setting that can have ramifications for the lobbying of commercial
diplomats for the public procurement contracts.
‘Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990, p. 3). The
role of the institutions is to reduce uncertainty by providing a stable framework of
how humans operate in a particular society (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Hence, acquiring
knowledge of the structure of an alien part of the world ensures a reduction in
information costs and provides an opportunity to engage in international trade
(North, 1991). As Hodgson (2006) points out, it is important to be aware of the
formal and informal institutional aspects, as the former relates to ‘political and
(judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts’ (North, 1990, p. 47) and the latter
concerns ‘codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and conventions’ (North, 1990,
p. 36) — i.e. the social institutions (Chan et al., 2008).
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and not live up to their potential (Campos, 2000; North, 1991; Scully, 1988). At the
same time, countries with better institutions tend to trademore (Dollar &Kraay, 2003).
And with the trade comes economic growth and development (e.g. Rodriguez &
Rodrik, 2001). Better institutions, or strongly developed institutions, indicate that the
rules are respected, in a sense that the government and public obey these rules, which
also means that in case of violation of rules there are certain measures to be taken.
Hence, strong institutional development ensures certainty that the rules are conformed
to, which leads the companies to conclude that it is safe to do business in a country.
There are different kinds of this (un)certainty. Political uncertainty, or political
instability, which refers to the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi,
2010) has less of an effect on the decision of a company to trade in certain countries
(Knack & Keefer, 1995). Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that property rights
protection and other forms of legal certainty play a more crucial role when it comes to
the size of foreign trade and investment in a host country. Campos (2000) also showed
that the rule of law is one of the conditions for the economic development and growth
of a country. For example, if a company is sure that it has legal protection when it
comes to ownership and property rights in a specific country and thus the risk of
being deceived and losing money is low, then this company feels safer to trade in this
country. Hence, such institutional environment can be denoted as friendly for the
foreign companies. Corruption, which refers to capture of the state by elites and
private interests (Kaufmann et al., 2010), can stand in the way of this legal certainty,
because it makes it possible for some companies to disobey the rules as long as they
can capture the state. When it is accepted that the rules are disobeyed by some
companies, it becomes difficult for other companies to anticipate how the market
operates and they refrain from doing business in this country or even entering this
market (Tsui-Auch & Mo¨llering, 2010). When the rules are disregarded, it indicates
that institutional development is weak.
Accordingly, commercial diplomats seeking to promote businesses in a country
with a weak institutional development — where information is difficult to obtain due
to pliable rules, corruption and a lack of transparency — are likely to engage in
‘market-preparation’ measures first. These measures would be directed at helping the
country to strengthen its institutions, before lobbying for specific business interests.
The efforts will also be directed at creating a level playing field, where all companies
have to play by the same set of rules. For example, the diplomats would try to
contribute to improvement of rules by suggesting different policy designs, or other
check-and-balance tools that could ensure that the rules are obeyed in a country. As a
result, the institutional development will improve and it will become more attractive
for companies to trade with the host country. On the other hand, if the institutional
development is weak, a lot depends on personal networks (North, 1991). Hence,
diplomats would have to rely on their personal networks when assisting companies. In
countries where institutional development is strong, the commercial diplomats would
not have to engage in such ‘market-preparation’ measures and can assist companies in
their specific needs more.
262 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lOne of the important decisions in lobbying is the decision of whom to lobby. The
answer can be found when looking at the institutional structure of government. This
variable can be conceptualized two dimensionally, as it can involve a lot of different
layers of government and different interest group consultation mechanisms. The
decentralized structure of the government signifies that there are many interacting
decision-making levels of government among which the authority and responsibility
is distributed. Thus, it implies that not only central government bares the
responsibility for decision-making, but different committees or other public
authorities and regional or municipal levels of government are also involved in
the decision-making process. Hence, the more decentralized the government is, the
more levels of the government the diplomats would have to address in their
lobbying strategy as more people are involved in the decision-making process
(Eising, 2007; Heitshusen, 2000; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2008). If the decision-
making process moves slowly, lobbyists will take advantage of it to lobby more
decision-makers (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). Also, when the lobbying group needs
a majority of decision-makers to approve the candidacy, the lobbyists are likely to
target more people (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Mack, 2005; Vining et al., 2005).
Accordingly, when the government structure reflects centralized government, the
diplomats would engage in less extensive lobbying as the number of decision-makers
will be smaller.
When looking at whom to lobby, it is also interesting to see whether there is any
interest group consultation mechanism in a country. If the system reflects corporatist
structures, which means that there is room for negotiations between organized
interests of civil society and decision-makers (Schmitter, 1974), the lobbying group
will be able to work closely with the decision-makers, as the system allows for an
opportunity to target the decision-makers directly (Lowery, 2002; Mahoney &
Baumgartner, 2008). On the other hand, if the system reflects totalitarian structures,
where there is no room for interest group consultation mechanism as there is only one
body taking decisions, the lobbying diplomats will have to ‘devise creative ways to get
the attention of decision-makers and have their message stand out from the
cacophony of lobbying communications’ (Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2008, p. 1266).
When it comes to whether a lobbying group is used to the system of interest
representation — due to the resemblance of the host and domestic institutional
structures — Eising (2007), against his expectations, found that it does not have an
influence on the success of lobbying. Hence, the lobbying diplomats will not be
disadvantaged if they come from a different institutional structure when compared to
the host country. At the same time, Hamada (2007) also found that the flexibility of
the lobbying diplomats to adapt to different environments is a better determinant of
success.
Another aspect of institutional setting that has an effect on the manner of lobbying
is whether decision-makers are elected or not. Decision-makers who are elected are
more responsive to the wishes of their constituency, as they recognize their electoral
vulnerability (Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2008). If the decision-makers can be hold
accountable for their actions through (re)elections, then lobbyists will engage in
coalition building and acquiring of as much support from the decision-makers’
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preference (Mahoney, 2007). On the other hand, as the positions of the appointed
decision-makers are not dependent on the results of election and thus are not sensitive
to constituency pleasing, they will be ‘more attuned to information about policy
feasibility and direct communications about policy details’ (Mahoney & Baumgartner,
2008, p. 1264).
Summing up, when the institutional development is weak, the companies will not
feel as safe to invest and trade and thus may stay away from the market. In such cases
the commercial diplomats will likely try to engage in ‘market-preparation’ measures
first. These measures would be directed at helping the country to strengthen its
institutions, before lobbying for specific business interests. A weak institutional
development is also characterized by a dependence on the networks. Thus, diplomats
would have to rely on their personal networks when assisting companies. In countries
where institutional development is strong, the commercial diplomats would not have
to engage in such ‘market-preparation’ measures and can assist companies in their
specific needs more. A system which is characterized by corporatist structure will offer
more opportunities to lobby the public procurement decision-makers directly (‘access’
lobbying). If there is no such mechanism (in case of a totalitarian structure), the
diplomats would be forced to lobby in other — creative and probably indirect — ways
(‘voice’ lobbying). If decision-making powers in a public procurement process are
decentralized, diplomats would have to lobby more people to be effective.
Accordingly, when the government structure reflects centralized government, the
diplomats would engage in less extensive lobbying as the number of decision-makers
will be smaller. And finally, whether the officials are appointed or elected will
determine whether diplomats will engage in coalition building and acquiring of as
much support as possible for the diplomats’ outcome preference.Conceptual Model and Conclusion
Based on the literature, there is support that the institutional setting influences the
lobbying style of commercial diplomats (Fig. 1).
By linking these streams of literature, different perceptions about the relationship
between the concepts emerge.
When the weak institutional development of the host country creates an environ-
ment where international companies do not feel safe, the commercial diplomats will
direct their efforts at informational lobbying of the decision-makers in order to
persuade them to invest in institutional development. In such an environment, the
commercial diplomats are likely to rely on their network and their influential mass of
befriended stakeholders and invest in good relationships with them. Due to the weak
institutional development leading to a lack of information and transparency of the
system, the commercial diplomats are also likely to have difficulties with getting the
timing of their lobbying actions right. On the other hand, if the institutional
development is strong, the commercial diplomats can focus more on lobbying for
specific commercial interests.
Institutional setting
Institutional development
(weak / strong)
Institutional structure
(corporatist / totalitarian)
(decentralized / centralized)
Decision-makers
(appointed / elected)
Lobbying aspects
Informational lobbying
Reliance on the networks
“Access” – direct lobbying
“Voice” - indirect lobbying
Constituency-building 
lobbying
Figure 1: Conceptual model.
264 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lIf the institutional setting reflects corporatist structures, the commercial diplomats
are likely to have more direct and frequent contact with the decision-makers
responsible for public procurement. Their lobbying activities are likely to correspond
to an ‘access’-driven strategy, where they focus their lobbying directly on the
authorities. If the decision-making powers are dispersed and there are many levels of
decision-making, the commercial diplomats are likely to target them all. Moreover,
they are likely to target even more people if the decision-making process takes a lot of
time. Accordingly, when the government structure reflects centralized government,
the diplomats would have to lobby fewer decision-makers. If it is difficult to gain
access to the authorities due to totalitarian structure, the commercial diplomats are
likely to focus more on a ‘voice’-driven strategy, where they would have to find other
ways to get noticed and indirectly influence the decision of the decision-makers.
When the decision-makers in the public procurement committee are elected, the
commercial diplomats are likely to pursue constituency-building lobbying. When the
authorities are appointed, the commercial diplomats are likely to focus on
informational lobbying.
The following sets of propositions are derived from the conceptual model.
P1. If commercial diplomats find themselves in a weak institutional development
environment, they are likely to focus on informational lobbying and rely heavily on
their networks. If institutional development is strong, commercial diplomats are
likely to focus on lobbying for specific commercial interests.
P2. If the institutional setting reflects corporatist structures, the commercial
diplomats are likely to focus on ‘access’-driven strategy. If it reflects totalitarian
structures, the commercial diplomats are likely to focus more on ‘voice’-driven
strategy.
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commercial diplomats are likely to engage all levels of it in their campaign. If it is
centralized, the commercial diplomats are likely to concentrate on lobbying of only
few decision-makers.
P4. If the decision-makers are democratically chosen, the commercial diplomats
are likely to pursue constituency-building lobbying. If the decision-makers are
appointed, the commercial diplomats are likely to focus on informational lobbying.Methodology
The reviewed literature indicated how the institutional setting can influence lobbying.
Important scientific contributions of this research involve applying this literature to
commercial diplomacy and examining the plausibility of a link between the lobbying
activities of the commercial diplomats and the institutional setting, as described in the
conceptual model of the previous section. However, the literature on itself does not
provide all the necessary tools to examine the model. So far, it has only been possible
to distil certain determining aspects of lobbying and not uncover specific lobbying
techniques that are relevant for the commercial diplomats. Therefore, this study aims
at another scientific contribution: identifying the practice of commercial diplomats’
lobbying that could be translated into measurable indicators of lobbying activities.
With such contribution, this research intends to build a foundation for larger scale
research on the topic.Research Design
A single-case study approach was selected as a means of uncovering the so far
unknown lobbying activities of the diplomats. Siggelkow (2007) argued that ‘research
involving case data can usually get much closer to theoretical constructs’ (p. 22).
Therefore, it allows for a certain depth to explore the still unmeasured lobbying
activities of the commercial diplomats. At the same time it provides for an
opportunity to see whether there is any plausible link between institutional setting and
lobbying activities at all. A single case cannot prove causality; it can only exhibit a
link (Siggelkow, 2007). Hence, such design allows for a ‘pilot’ illustration of the
introduced conceptual model and understanding of its mechanism (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Gerring, 2004; Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007; Swanborn,
2010).
It is important to pay attention to the criticism of a single-case study approach,
where it is argued that it does not provide for the possibility to generalize upon the
results (Bennett, 2004; Gerring, 2001; Grix, 2004, Yin, 2003), its internal validity can
be weak (Bennett, 2004; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2003), and construct validity and
reliability are threatened (Gerring, 2001; Yin, 2003).
266 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lSwanborn (2010) notices that ‘all research boils down to comparison’ (p. 15),
which facilitates the ability to generalize from the findings, thus also a single-case
study is no exception. Gerring (2001) and Bennett and Elman (2006) explain that
external validity does not have to be jeopardized if the case is selected well: if it
represents a typical case2 then representativeness can be high as there is an indirect
comparison with other cases (which have a peripheral position in the research
design). At the same time, a single case relies on the within-case comparison
(Gerring, 2001; Swanborn, 2010). Hence, this study chose a typical case of an
emerging country: Indonesia (OECD, 2009). It employed within-case comparison of
the units of analysis — i.e. the commercial diplomats. Internal validity is increased
by employing pattern-matching logic, where the expectations from a theoretical
model are reflected on the findings (Bennett, 2004; De Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2003). The
data was analyzed for possible alternative explanations (Siggelkow, 2007; Yin,
2003), like the interest of the home country in the host country. By choosing the
case not on the dependent variable, the internal validity is increased as well (Geddes,
2003). Construct validity is warranted by using different sources for data collection.
The reliability of the research is safeguarded by the case-study protocols (Gerring,
2001; Yin, 2003).Data Collection
Semi-structured interviews were chosen to research the lobbying activities of the
commercial diplomats, as they provide an opportunity to explore the subject of the
still unknown lobbying activities. Interviewing suits the purpose of the study well,
as it allows a certain degree of flexibility and leaves room to consider unexpected
lines of enquiry (Fontana & Frey, 2000; Grix, 2004). The aspects of lobbying that
were identified in the literature guided the questions. Despite the advantages of
such interviewing, the replicability of such research may be low; to counteract this
challenge, this study provides a detailed protocol.
In Jakarta, there are 19 embassies of the members of the EU. The interviews were
conducted with the commercial diplomats of 12 embassies. No response was received
from four embassies. One embassy no longer has a commercial/economic department
in Jakarta, and no appointment could be scheduled with two embassies due to the
diplomats’ busy agendas. Additionally, three interviews were conducted with com-
mercial diplomats from two chambers of commerce and one commercial diplomat
from the EU delegation. This was done in order to increase the scope of under-
standing of the commercial diplomats’ lobbying activities from a third party. In total,
this amounted to 15 interviews.
The data for the institutional setting is collected from different sources: Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) research project index and recent reports on the public
procurement system in Indonesia. The former identifies governance as institutions by2This approach seeks to find the most usual case in a particular population.
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(2008) developed an institutional development index for the years 1996–2001 for
different countries and found that political institutions have the highest correlation
with the development index, when compared to economic and social institutions.
Hence, this index suits this study when it comes to making conclusions about
institutional development.
WGI reflects the statistical compilation of 31 sources such as surveys on the
quality of governance given by many enterprises, citizens, experts, think tanks,
NGOs, and other international organizations (Kaufmann et al., 2010). It covers more
than 200 countries. It identifies six dimensions of governance: voice and account-
ability (VA), political stability and absence of violence (PV), government effectiveness
(GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL) and control of corruption (CC)
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). The range of possible scores differs from 2.5 (weak) to
þ2.5 (strong) governance performance. The index also uses a percentile ranking of the
countries.
To learn more about the public procurement system in Indonesia, its institutional
structure, the most recent reports were studied: TI-USA, and CIPE, and TII (2011)
and Attstro¨m and Ismail (2010). They were chosen because of the independence of
their authors. The document presented by Attstro¨m and Ismail (2010) evaluates an
Australian aid project given to the government of Indonesia in order to help it to
strengthen its public procurement institutions. At the same time, it also evaluates the
progress the Indonesian government has booked so far. TI-USA et al. (2011) assessed
the extent to which the APEC4 procurement transparency standards in Indonesia
reduced corruption. Thus, these reports also shed light on its institutional structure
and on the decision-makers.Data Analysis
In order to analyze transcribed interviews, the constant comparative method (Boeije,
2002) was applied. Open coding is a first stage where in a single interview ‘interactions
are compared with others for similarities and differences. They are also given
conceptual labels. In this way, conceptually similar interactions are grouped together
to form categories and subcategories’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). This presented the
core of the interview content. The next stage was to compare the categories between
the interviews to come up with a typology, the so-called axial coding (Boeije, 2002).
The typologies of activities were then categorized along the lines of the theoretical
model: informational lobbying, reliance on the networks, ‘access’ lobbying, ‘voice’
lobbying, and constituency-building lobbying.3Kaufmann et al. (2010) specify further that governance concerns ‘the process by which governments are
selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them’ (p. 3).
4Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
268 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lThe WGI was analyzed for the scores that Indonesia has on the six dimensions and
the relative ranking of the scores among all countries. In order to draw conclusions
about its institutional development, the scores and the ranks were compared with
other emerging countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — to see
how the institutional development of Indonesia scored in its own group. The average
scores and average rankings of the six dimensions were computed per country to
make the comparisons possible. Moreover, the information of Indonesia was
compared to the scores and ranks of 12 members of the EU whose commercial
diplomats were interviewed, to see how the host countries’ institutional development
differs from the domestic one. Again, the comparisons relied on the individual scores
and also on the means per country and per group. This put the scores and ranking of
Indonesia in perspective of the participating commercial diplomats, and thus it
provided more insights into how commercial diplomats themselves could perceive the
institutional development.
The reports on the public procurement system in Indonesia were studied for the
institutional structure of the system: whether it is decentralized or centralized, and
whether the system allows for interest group representation (corporatist or total-
itarian structures). Moreover, the documents were studied for how the decision-
makers gain their post and to whom they report.
The final step of data analysis was bringing the information acquired through
interviews, indices, and reports together in order to see whether the model illustrated
the findings. The propositions were examined, and the findings were also discussed in
terms of how influential the interest of the home country in the host country is on the
lobbying activities the diplomats undertake.Results
This section first presents the lobbying activities, then the findings on the institutional
setting are laid out, and finally, it concludes with applying the conceptual framework
to the findings.Lobbying Aspects
The interviews provided rich insights into how commercial diplomats lobby in
Indonesia. The conceptual categories of the lobbying aspects gained a more practical
meaning. This is summarized in Table 1.
Informational lobbying. Lobbying activities were categorized as informational
lobbying, if they captured activities that are aimed at informing the government
officials of the consequences of their measures, pointing out the need to change some
regulations as they are disadvantaging certain groups, and cooperating with the
government officials on certain policies. Typically, this was exhibited in printed
communication.
Table 1: Lobbying activities of EU diplomats in Indonesia.
Lobbying aspects Activitiesa Frequency
scoreb
Informational lobbying  A joint committee on some field of
cooperation [Hp1]
 Distribute advanced leaflets to top
sectors of government or potential
partner companies [Cp5, Jp2, Op1]
 Responsiveness to the
disadvantageous measures [Ap2þp4,
Bp6, Dp4]
 Close cooperation on trade and
investment policies in the EU
framework [Ap4, Bp6, Cp12, Ep5, Fp1,
Gp5, Hp3, Ip1þp3, Jp4, Np6]
12
Reliance on the
networks
 Introduce the companies to the
contacts of the acquired network
[A p8þp9þp13þBp3þCp3]
 Answer the invitations of
associations, government events
[Ap1,Cp1, Fp1, Ip2]
 Organize informal lunches and
receptions [Bp8, Cp1þp2]
 Invite government officials to the
home country (otherwise advise
home companies to invite them)
[Cp2, Fp1, Mp1þp4þp6, Np3]
 Organize visits of home countries’
high-level people (royal, ministers,
president) [Cp5, Dp13, Jp2]
 Business trips, trade missions [Bp4,
Ep1þp3þp4, Mp1þp2, Np3]
10
‘Access’ lobbying  Different levels of government are
contacted on a frequent basis [Ap1,
Hp2, Mp1þp4þp6, Np2þp3þp5]
 Explanation meeting after
publication of the public
procurement tender [Gp1]
 Organize business lunches with
government officials [Cp2]
6
‘Voice’ lobbying  Organize theme seminars on a
frequent basis [A p3þp7, Bp4, Cp5,
Dp11, Ep1þp3þp4, Fp1
þ, Ip1þp3, Jp1þp2,
Mp1þp2, Np2þp3þp5
þ, Op1]
11
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 269
Table 1: (Continued)
Lobbying aspects Activitiesa Frequency
scoreb
 Invite country’s national champions
to attract other players [Ep3]
 Invite journalists to events organized
by the embassy [Cp5]
 Frequent section/columns in
newspaper [Ap7, Bp8, Ip1þp3]
 Matchmaking events [Ap19,
Bp2þp3,Cp10, Ip1þp3]
 Business to business events [Jp1þp2]
Constituency building Involve host country’s civil society
organizations or associations in the
campaign [Dp10,Hp3]
2
a
Capital letters refer to different commercial diplomats; p numbers refer to the number of the paragraph of
the transcribed interview where the reference can be found; a plus refers to special importance given by the
diplomat to the activity.
bFrequency score tells how many diplomats have practiced the activities of a particular category.
270 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lAlmost all diplomats (12) indicated they were involved in close cooperation on
trade and investment policies in the EU framework. Every month the commercial
diplomats are invited to the EU delegation to discuss pressing matters and the
progress the EU has made in its talks with the Indonesian government. The diplomats
are welcome to raise issues of concern, so that the EU is aware of any problems and
could channel the information to the Indonesian government in the appropriate
manner. The EU delegation collects these complaints in order to make a credible case
towards the Indonesian government.
G. ‘With EU embassies we have once amonth (even more usually) economic council
meeting, and sometimes there are subgroups for food, pharmacy, logistics — it
depends on the issues. Then there is a political council meeting, the development
council meeting [y] and the EU delegation is very active. We for sure meet and
cooperate, give input to each other, inform on the state visits, so what are they
organizing’.
Sometimes it is more effective to present a complaint from a big investor company
than have diplomats deploring about it for a long time:
D. ‘It is much more impressive if a CEO of such a company says such a
thing, when compared to civil servant or even EU ambassador saying the same
thing’.
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Indonesian government. This is done in order to stress how important the matter is.
A. ‘Usually there will be letters sent, in some cases it is done under the EU
authority. In addition to that, we also talk to the relevant actors. The decision to
point something out on behalf of the EU depends on how important the issue is’.
Fewer countries had joint committees in a certain field of cooperation. Another
important aspect is that the diplomats have to be very careful not to criticize the
Indonesian government in public. If they do disagree with the Indonesian
government, it is important to present solutions and present the home country as a
partner without being too aggressive.
A. ‘You always have to think what is the best strategy to approach the matter, and
in this country you have to be very careful. If you would seek confrontation too
obviously it would bounce back and work against you. Loosing face or damaging
somebody’s image is here very sensitive. So it is not done to demand something in
the papers or something like that. You would lose immediately then’.
An interesting observation by the EU delegate was that some other countries, like
China, Japan or Australia, engage in financing of advisory committees to the
decision-making body. In this way they can influence the policy formation at an early
stage, for example what Indonesia would regard as standards for green ecological
cars. Japan has different standards than the EU, so it can be disadvantageous for the
EU companies if Japan advises on these standards. Hence, EU countries should also
use these opportunities to influence the rules and standards in their favour. According
to one diplomat:
D. ‘The embassies and people that work here all deliver great job. What they could
do is lobby to get more money for the offensive interests, so that we could indeed
finance a parliamentarian committee here for. It is just a simple example, but there
are lots of things where you could think of different cooperation. Last year, we did
something interesting with the postal industry; we invited European regulators for
a workshop to explain to Indonesians the postal reform (liberalization) in Europe
and how can you make it work. This kind of contact is very important. While the
EU does not have the budget to invite people to do this, we are dependent on the
member states’ willingness to send somebody’.Reliance on the networks. Lobbying activities were categorized as reliance on the
networks, if they captured different attempts where diplomats make use of their
network in order to get the results (e.g. introduce the company to a decision-maker),
and different ways in which the diplomats attempt to strengthen the ties by attending
different events, or inviting different people, which would strengthen the relationship
between the countries. It was usually exhibited in a lot of face-to-face communication.
Almost all diplomats (10) indicated that they work on their networks, building
relationships with relevant decision-makers and using these contacts whenever it is
272 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lhelpful for the companies (e.g. introducing them to relevant decision-makers or
influential parties).
A. ‘For a part it [list of contacts] indeed comes from the network that we have built
up through the years, and then we often know that if we bring the company in
contact with that person then most likely that person will be able to guide them
further and introduce them to other people. [y] So usually we go to a person who
knows people and how things work, and of course he should be willing and
prepared to help us. Next to it, it comes down to calling around. You start with a
few people that you do know and then go further. We call them and tell about the
matter, ask whether he knows anybody whom they should talk to, etc. And then
you call those people and go on and go on. So it is very labour intensive, but this is
the way how it works, especially in this country where you do not have good
databases, directories or sort alike’.
The diplomats made sure they showed up at the different events they were invited
to by different Indonesian authorities, in this way showing them respect by paying
attention to their cause:
A. ‘That is why all the meetings and sessions to which we are invited are not always
directly interesting for us, but from this perspective they are very important to
attend to. So your presence is usually noticed and appreciated. So if you do such a
gesture then people are more prepared if you asked them for something to help you
and do their gesture in return’.
The diplomats also organized different informal events to which important
stakeholders were invited. Some diplomats effectively managed to invite Indonesian
officials from different levels and committees of the government to their home
country to show different examples of progress in their industries. Some have
suggested to the companies they assist to invite certain people to their country and to
show them in practice what the companies are talking about. It is much easier to
persuade decision-makers if they can be shown the achievements. What many
diplomats acknowledged, although not everybody was able to practise it, is the
importance of having top people from their own government pay a visit to Indonesia.
They explained that this strengthens the relationships between the countries, which
usually lead to more interest in the things the diplomat’s country has to offer. An
example of a diplomat who answered whether political interest from high-level
officials of his country would have been helpful for the businesses:
G. Absolutely, yes, definitely! In this type of country the government is very
important. Because, first you send a MOU [memorandum of understanding] on
whatever: a technical cooperation, scientific cooperation, commercial cooperation.
Then they start trusting you because they know that the government is behind the
private — the business initiative. So first you have to open with a memorandum.
And then the business can easily come and do business. [y] If you have big
companies they can go absolutely by themselves, they do not need us even to reach
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 273a minister — no problem. But because my country is more composed of SMEs they
do not have the strength, the means to go alone by themselves. So this is for whom
such political actions would help a lot’.
Business trips and trade missions have the same effect on the relationship with the
country, indicated diplomats. The existence of historical bonds certainly helped the
diplomats in their work because the Indonesian authorities were familiar with them or
knew what the diplomat’s country had done for Indonesia in terms of investment.
Hence, the interest was easier to trigger.‘Access’ lobbying. Lobbying activities were categorized as ‘access’ lobbying, if they
captured the direct attempts of the diplomats to contact government officials with the
aim to discuss different measures and propose different ideas. This was typically
exhibited in a lot of formal meetings and exclusive appointments.
These historical bonds might also be the reason why only a few diplomats were able
to have direct appointments with the Indonesian decision-makers on a frequent basis.
A. ‘My country has then the advantage that we have a very good access to the
government and ministerial level, as we still have a very special relation. Especially
when you compare it with other European countries. [y] And of course we try to
take the full advantage of it’.
Diplomats acknowledged that the direct lobbying intensifies if the host country is a
priority for the home country. And not all EU countries see Indonesia as a priority in
the international economic relations. At the same time, there were diplomats
indicating that Indonesia has an extremely difficult institutional environment, which
makes it difficult for diplomats to have direct meetings with the officials. One
diplomat referred to having appointments with the Indonesian authorities as a
challenging task:
G. ‘It is really based on personal relationship so if you get to know somebody
because of any reason, it is easier. If you just ask for an appointment they usually
do not answer. You have to find your own way to get a network or people in every
ministry that can help with what you need. Maybe you meet at seminars,
exhibitions, conferences. It is good then to invite them if you organize something,
or to keep in touch because when you need to get to the right level [y] if you know
somebody inside an organization it is helping a lot. Usually face to face contacts
work the best’.
At the time the interviews were conducted, there was a government reshuffle, some
ministers were appointed to another function and some were replaced. This made the
cooperation and appointments with the government officials more difficult. In
general, some have also indicated that it was virtually impossible to get through and
arrange an appointment.
274 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨l‘Voice’ lobbying. Lobbying activities were categorized as ‘voice’ lobbying, if they
captured the indirect attempts of commercial diplomats to attract the attention of the
decision-makers, by organizing different events where businesses meet, by inviting
decision-makers to join such events and hold speeches, and publishing in newspapers,
journals etc. This was displayed in a lot of creative ways to attract attention.
All diplomats with sufficient capacity engaged in organizing different seminars.
Only two embassies could not because they do not have enough staff and little
commercial competence from their home governments. Two other diplomats even
indicated that organizing such seminars was the best way to attract attention. It is
important to have such events planned throughout the year and hold them
consistently and organize them in a coherent way, paying a lot of attention to whom
to invite:
C. ‘We usually try to take to bring a non-business actor from our country, an
expert from some academic institution who will present that, for instance, in this
city we did this and this and this, and it worked out very well, without mentioning
the specific company. But people understand that it is about business but then the
politicians might get inspired. It is then not so pushy’.
The diplomats made sure to invite representatives of different levels and com-
mittees of the Indonesian government. They also organized different business and
match-making events. What was noticed by most of the diplomats was that com-
petition is fierce in Indonesia. A lot of Chinese companies get contracts. The EU
diplomats suspect that Chinese companies are backed by their government, and they
present factual information in a better light than it actually is when applying for a
project. This gives them a competitive advantage when compared to the European
companies, which do not have financial backing from their governments. Therefore,
it becomes important when organizing such events to invite different banks
and try to erase the advantage of Chinese companies by offering opportunities for
the companies to network with the banks about the possible financing of their
projects. When it comes to media promotion, some had sections in the newspapers
or journals about, for example, industrial innovations and solutions in their
countries:
A. ‘Every once or twice a year we publish in the ‘Now Jakarta’ a whole section on
our country. And there we make sure to highlight some interesting sectors in more
detail. Minister of Economic Affairs has agreed to write a passage for the annual
report of Oxford Business Group, and then we link it also to this newspaper on the
topic of bilateral relationship’.
Although most of the diplomats were pleased with how they organize such events,
chambers of commerce expressed that these events were not always organized in a
consistent way. For example, sometimes a follow-up was missing after a big event,
which is crucial for making some business proposals concrete. The seminars are great
in facilitating network opportunities for the companies, but without a follow-up,
some companies would be just left with promises from their counterpart without
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 275any specific business proposals. Especially smaller companies need that. It was
noteworthy that not all diplomats were fully aware of what other European diplomats
were doing and organizing.
Constituency building. Lobbying activities were categorized as constituency build-
ing, when they captured the attempts of diplomats to ally with host countries’
important business associations or civil societies.
The diplomats did not involve many civil society organizations or business
associations in their lobbying. Chambers of commerce found it regrettable that some
diplomats did not involve them, especially because they have good networks with the
host country’s business associations. One diplomat especially did recognize the
relevance of involving Indonesian stakeholders:
D. ‘It is once again a very intern-oriented country. This also means that the
Indonesian ministers will be more inclined to listen to KADIN [Indonesian
chamber of commerce], or APINDO [employees association], than when compared
to a Dutch company or EU delegation, as an example. So about lobbying, what we
have learned here is that, if there is a problem then we should look whether we can
find Indonesian champions which have an interest in European pleads. That is
always a bit tricky, because if we cannot find the Indonesian counterparts who
would lobby with us, then I think there is little sense to lobby at all’.
Miscellaneous findings. Through interviews it became apparent that diplomats invest
a lot of their time in directly assisting companies, as opposed to indirect support
through lobbying. Legal assistance was found to be very important: diplomats often
engaged in explaining the rules of the country or stood by them in courts. One pointed
out that it is very important that their companies understand the business culture in
Indonesia, as it differs from what some of them might be used to. For example, the
business culture is not that direct and straightforward. There is a legitimate need to
invest in building personal relations with the Indonesian companies, and showing
respect for the country’s traditions.
G. ‘Indonesian market is not very easy, because if you want to have success you
have to stay here, you have to cultivate your relations on a regular basis, etc.’
The diplomats thus guide the companies in the process of selecting their channels of
promotion, encouraging them to come here if they are serious about doing business in
Indonesia. They also conduct sector analysis and market scans for the companies, and
even search for possible partners for them. Some countries have specific conditional
funds for the companies if they engage in development cooperation, or would like to
participate in exhibition fairs.
Most of the diplomats stressed the importance of the home companies being
interested in Indonesia. Therefore, they invest a lot of time in ensuring that companies
back home are aware of the investment and trade opportunities. Some have special
websites where they update the information regularly about the public tenders and
276 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lprocurement projects. At home, different events are organized to raise the awareness
of the attractiveness of the host country — Indonesia. In this way they hope to trigger
the interest of the companies. If there is no interest, the diplomats cannot do that
much. Despite all the efforts to provide companies with fresh information, some
diplomats pointed out that they are not always successful in bringing useful
information to the firms, either because they already know of existing public
procurement tenders or the time frame scheduled for the application is too narrow to
apply. The diplomats often suspect that the winners have already been selected before
the tenders are published because the application deadline is too short, making it
impossible for many companies to apply.Institutional Setting
To find out more on the institutional setting of Indonesia, the data from the WGI and
the reports on public procurement system of Indonesia were examined.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators. The WGI gives insights into institutional
development of a country. The WGI data on the countries was examined on six
dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.
Each country has an estimated score of governance performance on each of the
dimensions, ranging from 2.5 (weak) to þ2.5 (strong), which indicates the level of
institutional development. Such score is then put in perspective of the scores of other
200 countries in the percentile rank. Hence, it clarifies what the individual estimated
score signifies when compared to other countries’ results. For each country an average
of the six dimensions per estimated score and per ranking was computed. This gives
an indication of overall score and ranking of a country. The scores and ranking of
Indonesia were compared to the scores and rankings of other emerging countries,
such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and the scores and rankings of
12 members of the EU whose commercial diplomats were interviewed.
Table 2 summarizes the data from the WGI on emerging countries. The computed
average for Indonesia is 0.478. This suggests that institutional development is rather
weak, especially if comparing Indonesian score with the other 200 countries:
Indonesia ranks in the 35th percentile. Together the group of emerging countries has
a score of 0.289, and ranks in the 42nd percentile. This indicates that Indonesia
scores fourth within the group of six emerging countries, scoring better than Russia
and China. Within its scores, Indonesia scores best for the VA dimension with
0.055, placing Indonesia in the 48th percentile on this dimension. This suggests that
Indonesian citizens are able to some extent to elect their government, and to express
their freedom of expression and association. However, it is still very limited, as in
more than half of the other countries the citizens can do it better. Emerging countries
score as a group very low on PV with an average score of 0.639, putting them in the
27th percentile. From all Indonesian scores, RL and CC score very low, 0.630 and
0.727 respectively. This suggests that legal certainty is low in Indonesia.
Table 2: The Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010: emerging countries.
Country WGI
VA PV GE RQ RL CC l
ID Estima 0.055 0.887 0.195 0.375 0.630 0.727 0.478
Rankb 48.341 18.868 47.847 39.713 31.280 27.272 35.554
BR Estima 0.499 0.048 0.071 0.189 0.002 0.056 0.144
Rankb 63.507 48.113 56.938 55.981 55.450 59.808 56.633
RU Estima 0.945 0.887 0.394 0.395 0.784 1.074 0.747
Rankb 20.853 18.396 41.627 38.278 26.066 12.919 26.357
IN Estima 0.424 1.315 0.007 0.393 0.058 0.517 0.311
Rankb 59.242 10.849 55.024 39.234 54.502 35.885 42.456
CN Estima 1.650 0.766 0.123 0.231 0.347 0.603 0.579
Rankb 5.213 24.057 59.808 44.976 44.550 32.536 35.190
ZA Estima 0.526 0.025 0.339 0.391 0.097 0.094 0.237
Rankb 65.403 44.340 65.072 62.679 57.820 60.766 59.347
m Estima 0.200 0.639 0.011 0.136 0.287 0.462 0.289
Rankb 43.760 27.437 54.386 46.810 44.945 38.198 42.589
Source: WGI retrieved from www.govindicators.org
VA, voice and accountability; PV, political stability and absence of violence; GE, government effectiveness; RQ, regulatory quality; RL, rule of law; CC, control
of corruption; ID, Indonesia; BR, Brazil; RU, Russia; IN,India; CN, China; ZA, South Africa.
a
Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately –2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance).
bPercentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank).
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278 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lTable 3 presents the data on the European countries and Indonesia. The ranks of
Indonesia become even less flattering if they are compared to the average of the 12
European countries, which is a group score þ1.145 and are ranked in the 82nd
percentile. PV scores of the EU members are also the lowest within their scores on six
dimensions. The best score of Indonesia, 0.055 for VA and accordingly its ranking
in the 48th percentile, is very low compared to the EU average: þ1.197 (84th
percentile). Where Indonesia scores 0.630 for RL and 0.727 for CC, EU scores in
average þ1.242 and þ1.155 respectively. Such comparison suggests that Indonesian
institutional development could be perceived by diplomats as very low, as most of the
scores of the EU are more than double higher when compared to the Indonesian
scores. Hence, when classifying the institutional development of Indonesia, these
scores suggest that it is very weak.
Reports. The examined reports, along with revealing how the public procurement
system works in Indonesia, strengthened the findings from the index.
Indonesia changed its governance system in 1999, ‘enacting two laws that signifi-
cantly decentralized government power and established regional autonomy’ (TI-USA
et al., 2011, p. 12). In 2001 a wide range of functions was assigned to districts and
municipalities. There are 33 provinces divided into 508 districts and municipal
government, each with its own administrative unit responsible for the provision of
government service and thus also public procurement. Government services included
‘public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, industry and
trade, capital investment, the environment, cooperatives, and manpower’ (TI-USA
et al., 2011, p. 12).
Indonesian public procurement has a tradition of being regulated through
presidential decrees. Unlike the procurement guidelines of the World Bank, which
encourage following the principle of economy, efficiency and transparency, the
presidential decrees had other objectives strongly influenced by the government policy
of that time, ‘for example efficient use of the State funds, promotion of domestic
product and services, equity and social justice’ (Attstro¨m & Ismail, 2010, p. 6). The
ambiguity of such objectives was disadvantageous when it came to implementation, as
they were subject to personal interpretation.
In 2006 the procurement units (ULP) were introduced that would be established at
all levels of the government agencies. They would take over the tasks of an ad hoc
tender committee of BAPPENAS (National Development and Planning Agency)
which had few resources and an unclear mandate, and be responsible for the
tendering process, ‘starting from preparing tender schedules, cost estimate of the
tendering package, advertisement, bid evaluation, and proposing bid winner’
(Attstro¨m & Ismail, 2010, p. 6). In 2007 the Indonesian Public Procurement Agency
(LKPP) was established with a mandate to ‘(i) develop public procurement strategy,
policy, and regulation; (ii) conduct monitoring and evaluation; (iii) implement
e-procurement; (iv) strengthen the skills of procurement officials; and (v) provide
advice, recommendations and complaint resolution’ (TI-USA et al., 2011, p. 16). That
organization’s early years have been marked by recruiting staff and developing its
infrastructure. Its ability to improve the regulatory and institutional environment of
Table 3: The Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010: interviewed European countries.
Country WGI
VA PV GE RQ RL CC l
NL Estima 1.494 0.934 1.733 1.794 1.809 2.145 1.652
Rankb 96.209 79.717 94.258 98.086 97.156 97.608 93.839
AT Estima 1.441 1.087 1.888 1.525 1.796 1.643 1.563
Rankb 95.735 88.679 97.608 93.301 96.682 92.345 94.058
SE Estima 1.583 1.076 2.016 1.720 1.948 2.251 1.766
Rankb 99.052 88.208 98.565 96.651 99.526 99.043 96.841
FR Estima 1.226 0.699 1.441 1.338 1.524 1.394 1.270
Rankb 89.100 70.755 89.474 87.081 90.521 88.995 85.988
DK Estima 1.581 1.010 2.167 1.901 1.878 2.374 1.819
Rankb 78.673 84.434 99.043 100 98.578 100 93.455
IT Estima 0.927 0.473 0.515 0.848 0.382 0.043 0.517
Rankb 75.829 62.264 67.943 77.033 62.559 57.416 67.174
BG Estima 0.486 0.377 0.007 0.607 0.080 0.183 0.202
Rankb 62.560 57.547 56.459 71.770 53.080 52.153 58.598
PT Estima 1.123 0.680 1.038 0.818 1.041 1.031 0.955
Rankb 84.834 69.811 81.818 75.598 83.412 81.340 79.469
PL Estima 1.033 0.999 0.706 0.974 0.687 0.447 0.808
Rankb 81.042 83.491 72.727 79.426 69.194 70.335 76.036
ES Estima 1.141 0.177 0.984 1.191 1.195 1.011 0.891
Rankb 85.782 39.151 79.426 84.211 86.730 80.861 76.027
UK Estima 1.313 0.404 1.561 1.745 1.770 1.482 1.379
Rankb 91.943 58.019 92.344 97.129 94.787 89.952 87.362
CZ Estima 1.018 0.973 1.008 1.237 0.953 0.307 0.916
Rankb 78.673 82.075 80.861 85.167 80.095 65.550 78.737
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Table 3: (Continued)
Country WGI
VA PV GE RQ RL CC l
m Estima 1.197 0.711 1.255 1.308 1.242 1.155 1.145
Rankb 84.953 72.013 84.211 87.121 84.360 81.300 82.326
ID Estima 0.055 0.887 0.195 0.375 0.630 0.727 0.478
Rankb 48.341 18.868 47.847 39.713 31.280 27.272 35.554
Source: WGI retrieved from www.govindicators.org
VA, voice and accountability; PV, political stability and absence of violence; GE, government effectiveness; RQ, regulatory quality; RL, rule of law; CC, control
of corruption; NL, the Netherlands; AT, Austria; SE, Sweden; FR, France; DK, Denmark; IT, Italy; BG, Bulgaria; PT, Portugal; PL, Poland; ES, Spain; UK,
United Kingdom; CZ, Czech Republic; ID, Indonesia.
a
Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately –2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance).
bPercentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank).
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Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 281public procurement depends on the ‘political support, mandate and the capacity of
the organization to define, communicate and realize its role in the procurement
system’ (Attstro¨m & Ismail, 2010, p. 1). Hence, the authors concluded that the
development of a good infrastructure for the agency depends highly on political
willingness and stability.
On 1 January 2011, the new Presidential Regulation 54/2010 came into effect. The
main achievement is that it divides the administration tasks within the procurement
system into three separate units. ‘The first [unit] is charged with planning and carrying
out procurements (the ‘Budget Authority’); the second is charged with determining
the implementation of individual procurements, such as defining tender specifications,
evaluating bids and awarding contracts, and monitoring the implementation of
contracts (the ‘Procurement Services Unit’ or ‘PPK’); and the third is the Project
Result Receiver Committee in charge of evaluating contracted outcomes’ (TI-USA
et al., 2011, p. 17).
Several challenges for public procurement in Indonesia were identified by Attstro¨m
and Ismail (2010) and TI-USA et al. (2011). There is a lot of ambiguity in terms of the
legal framework: there are conflicting regulations, missing guidelines, and no national
procurement law which could take precedence above other regulations. Moreover, the
highly decentralized system resulted into many local officials not being familiar with
the new regulation, and they avoid enforcing it (TI-USA et al., 2011). Attstro¨m and
Ismail (2010) acknowledge that LKPP’s success depends on building alliances and a
constituency to convince others of its usefulness and benefit, as the organization itself
does not have enforcement powers. However, little has been done to include the
participants of the system in commenting on the proposed regulations: even the
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and the Association of
Indonesian Employers (APINDO) are sometimes left out (TI-USA et al., 2011).
Additionally, while the new regulation ‘allows bidders to file a protest, there is no
clear protest handling mechanism and no clear sanctions for violation of the
procurement procedures’ (TI-USA et al., 2011, p. 17).
The organization also requires more professionalization. ‘It will require organisa-
tional development, skills development of procurement professionals, establishment
of incentive systems and career paths etc.’ in order for the procurement bodies to
function well (Attstro¨m & Ismail, 2010, p. 8). Attstro¨m and Ismail (2010) found that
there is little staff turnover anticipated in LKPP; therefore, the individual knowledge
will stay in the organization. At the same time, there is no mechanism to ensure the
knowledge transfer within the organization and other deputies.
Another challenge to an effective public procurement system is the high level
of corruption and lack of transparency. ‘According to a survey conducted by
Indonesia’s Procurement Watch in 2010, 89% of companies said they need to bribe
public officials to get a contract. The government estimates that corruption in
Indonesia’s public procurement is responsible for US$ 4 billion in losses every year’
(TI-USA et al., 2011, p. 14). There is hardly any mechanism which could prevent such
corruption. Civil society organizations lack effective access to information which
could allow monitoring of the government (TI-USA et al., 2011). When it comes to
bidders, the information is available but only for the ones who are familiar with the
282 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lsystem. ‘Sometimes the rules are changed in the middle of the procurement; other
times the deadline is shortened or extended. Winners are publicly announced but it is
rare that procurement officials provide technical or economic reasons for the choice’
(TI-USA et al., 2011, p. 28).
In conclusion, reports and scores of the WGI index point out that the institutional
development of Indonesia is low. The WGI scores suggest that Indonesian
institutional development is especially low when it comes to rule of law and control
of corruption. Hence, legal certainty is low as well. The reports indicate that the
institutional structure is highly decentralized: there are a lot of levels involved, and a
lot of actors are determining the course of actions. At the same time the reports reveal
that the system reflects to some extent corporatist structures. The WGI score for voice
and accountability dimension also suggests that there is some room for interest
representation mechanism in Indonesia. However, the interest representation
mechanism does not facilitate the participation of the interest groups — i.e. civil
society organizations and business associations — as much as the transparency
standards of APEC would call for. At the same time it has to be noted that the public
procurement body in Indonesia is young. There are still a lot of institutional
challenges to be met. Along with a lack of experience, the body also suffers from
corruptive malpractices and lack of transparency. This is also supported by the WGI
scores. Inefficiency and gaps in the regulation identified in the reports strengthen the
idea that institutional development is not high. The reports suggest that the decision-
makers in the public procurement system are not elected but appointed. Nevertheless,
they need stakeholders’ approval to be effective.
Conceptual Model, Propositions and Findings
According to the WGI index, the reports and even some of the interviews, the
institutional development of Indonesia is weak and faces a lot of challenges. Under
such conditions, the first set of proposition (P1) derived from the conceptual model
predicts that diplomats will focus on informational lobbying in order to persuade the
decision-makers to invest in institutional development as it would benefit the
European companies. At the same time the diplomats will rely heavily on the
networks they have acquired.
Indeed, the majority of diplomats engages in informational lobbying and relies and
invests in their networks. There are a lot of issues that need improvement in order to
make the Indonesian market more attractive for European companies. This is what
the diplomats try to achieve with their informational lobbying. A lot comes down to
personal relationships and favours. This is also what the diplomats experience as they
rely heavily on their network in order to assist the companies. Hence, P1 is illustrated.
With the institutional structure that characterizes the Indonesian public procure-
ment body, where there is no clear interest representation mechanism and decision
powers are decentralized, the conceptual model would prescribe ‘voice’ lobbying
targeting different levels (P2, P3).
It is also observed in Indonesia. The diplomats make sure to invite representatives
of different levels and committees of the decision-making body. Hence, P3 is
illustrated.
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 283As only a few are lucky to have direct appointments with decision-makers, the
majority of the diplomats engages in indirect attempts to influence the decision-makers’
preference and opinion through seminars, different receptions and other events.
This is the point where findings complement the model. It became apparent that
direct ‘access’ lobbying is a luxury that only the diplomats from countries with
historical close ties to the host country can enjoy. It does not mean that for the
remainder of the diplomats, it is impossible to make an appointment with the
decision-makers, but it does complicate the matter and makes it more difficult. At the
same time, the diplomats that could engage in ‘access’ lobbying also engaged in ‘voice’
lobbying to strengthen their efforts. Along with historical ties, the priority that the
host country has in the home country’s external economic policy determines how
extensive the lobbying can be. If there is room for extensive lobbying, i.e. ‘access’ and
‘voice’ lobbying combined, then the diplomats would engage in both. Some of the
diplomats pointed out that they do not have enough means, for example human
resources, to extensively lobby Indonesian decision-makers, because their country
does not consider Indonesia a priority in their economic relations. This usually
implied that the diplomats from these countries did not have enough budget or staff
to afford labour- and capital-intensive lobbying. Hence, such diplomats had only
restricted room for lobbying, which limited their activities. As Indonesia is not a clear
example of corporatist, or totalitarian structure, P2 could not be illustrated, as both
‘access’ and ‘voice’ lobbying was also applied.
The issue of priority leads to another aspect of the findings. The diplomats found it
very important for their lobbying activities to have companies from their home
countries that were interested in Indonesia. Therefore, they spent a lot of time making
companies aware of the business opportunities in Indonesia. Often, if Indonesia was
not a priority country for the diplomat, then there was usually also little interest from
the home country.
The decision-makers in the Indonesian public procurement body are appointed.
According to the conceptual model, the diplomats would not invest in constituency
building but rather would rely more on informational lobbying and providing factual
information (P4).
This is also shown in practice: the diplomats did not invest much energy in
constituency-building lobbying. Instead, they focused on informational lobbying.
Hence, P4 is illustrated.
Therefore, the findings reflect the model and at the same time complement it.Conclusion and Discussion
The research question was: to what extent does the institutional setting of a host
country determine the lobbying activities of European commercial diplomats in the
case of public procurement contracts in emerging countries? In order to answer the
research question, two research aims were formulated. The first aim of this research
has been to contribute to the understanding of how commercial diplomacy is
practised and, more specifically, derive a list of techniques used by the commercial
diplomats to lobby for the public procurement contracts for the companies which
284 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lthey assist. The second aim has been to illustrate the plausibility of a link between the
concept of institutional setting and lobbying activities of commercial diplomats.
The literature identifies that the institutional environment has ramifications for the
manner of lobbying and for the practice of commercial diplomacy. However, the
research which would combine these three concepts has not been conducted yet.
Therefore, this study brought together these different pieces of the puzzle. The
institutional setting was framed by institutional development, institutional structure
and whether the decision-makers are elected or not. Lobbying aspects that are
relevant for the commercial diplomat were identified as informational lobbying,
reliance on the networks, ‘access’ — direct lobbying, ‘voice’ — indirect lobbying, and
constituency-building lobbying.
The mechanism between the two concepts was expected to reflect the following
link. In a weak institutional development environment, the diplomats are likely to
focus on informational lobbying in order to persuade the decision-makers to invest in
institutional development as it would benefit the home companies which operate in
the host country. At the same time, the diplomats are likely to rely heavily on the
networks they have acquired. If institutional structure reflects totalitarian structure
and decision-making powers are decentralized, the diplomats are likely to engage in
‘voice’ lobbying, targeting different levels of the decision-making body. If the
decision-makers are elected, the diplomats are likely to engage in constituency-
building lobbying. If that is not the case, the diplomats are likely to rely more on
informational lobbying.
Indonesia has been chosen as a study case to illustrate the conceptual model and
come up with a list of lobbying activities used by the commercial diplomats, which
could facilitate larger scale research on the topic. Table 4 lists the lobbying activities
which could be translated into measurable indicators for a larger scale study.
The findings indeed illustrated the plausibility of the model to some extent. The
weak institutional development of the country necessitated informational lobbying
and network reliance by the commercial diplomats (P1 is illustrated). As decision-
making powers were decentralized, diplomats attempted to target different levels of
decision-making body (P3 is illustrated). Indonesia does not have a clear interest
representation mechanism. Both ‘voice’ and ‘access’ lobbying were applied by the
commercial diplomats (therefore P2 is not illustrated). And as decision-makers were
not elected, the diplomats almost never engaged in constituency-building lobbying
(P4). These findings therefore would lead to the conclusion that the institutional
setting of the host country indeed can have ramifications for the lobbying activities of
the European commercial diplomats in the case of public procurement contracts in
emerging countries.
However, the findings also revealed that the institutional setting of a host country
could not be the only determining factor. The domestic factors of the commercial
diplomats also play a role in how they lobby. The business interest of the home
country in the host country determines whether there is lobbying at all and how
extensive it will be. If there is little interest in doing business in the host country,
then the commercial diplomats do not lobby intensively. This interest is also related
to the priority the host country enjoys in the home country’s external economic
Table 4: Lobbying activities.
Lobbying aspects Indicators
Informational
lobbying
 A joint committee on some field of cooperation
 Distribution of advanced leaflets on top sectors at
government or potential partner companies
 Responsiveness to the disadvantageous measures
 Close cooperation with host government on trade and
investment policies
Reliance on the
networks
 Introduce the companies to the contacts of the acquired
network
 Answer the invitations of associations, government events
 Organization of informal lunches and receptions
 Invite government officials to home country (otherwise
advise companies to invite them)
 Organize visits of home countries’ high-level people (elite,
ministers, president)
 Business trips, trade missions
‘Access’ lobbying  Different levels of government are contacted on a frequent
basis
 Explanation meeting after publication of the public
procurement tender
 Organization of business lunches with government officials
‘Voice’ lobbying  Organization of theme seminars on a frequent basis
 Invite country’s national champions to attract other players
 Invite journalists to your events
 Frequent section/columns in newspaper
 Matchmaking events
 Business to business events
Constituency
building
Involve host country’s civil society organizations or
associations in the campaign
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 285policy, as it determines what tools the commercial diplomats have at their disposal.
It may concern financial but also human capital means, a lack of which under-
mines the commercial diplomats’ ability to engage in labour- and capital-intensive
lobbying, such as organizing expensive events and direct lobbying. Moreover, the
historical bilateral ties between the home and the host country can positively affect
the lobbying, by making it easier to lobby directly and even attract attention in
general.
At the same time, it is fair to state that these domestic factors are likely to play a
role in the whole existence of commercial diplomacy. If not for the economic interest
of the home country, would there be commercial diplomacy? The assumption emerges
286 Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨lthat the priority of the host country and historical ties will always intensify the
bilateral relationship. Hence, it is only natural that the diplomats from these countries
have an advantage over others. This advantage is then transferred to their lobbying
power.
Coming back to the second research aim, this study provided the first illustration
that the institutional setting can influence the lobbying activities of the European
commercial diplomats for public procurement contracts in emerging countries.
At the same time, the study suggested a legitimate assumption that domestic factors,
such as interest in the host country, priority status of the host country and histori-
cal bilateral ties, can positively influence the lobbying activities of the diplomats
as well.Limitations and Further Research
The research was limited in the beginning by the absence of measurable indicators for
the lobbying aspects. Therefore, a small-scale, extensive, qualitative study was needed
before being able to test the model on a larger scale. This involved a risk of having
findings that were not generalisable. Only one study case was chosen to illustrate
the model — Indonesia. However, Indonesia represents a typical emerging country
(OECD, 2009), and therefore the damage to external validity has been avoided in this
sense as much as possible. At the same time, N ¼ 15 is rather small, and even though
the aim was to illustrate the plausibility of the conceptual model, the findings could
be exaggerated because of such a small scale. Thus, future research should test the
model, with the introduced indicators, on a larger scale. Moreover, the future
research should also include different types of institutional settings, for example
countries with weak institutional development and countries with strong institutional
development, to make stronger conclusions about the mechanism of the model
possible.
In this study the assumption emerged that the priority of the host country and
historical ties will always intensify the bilateral relationship. It is only natural that the
diplomats from these countries have an advantage over others. This assumption
would be interesting to test in further research providing some empirical evidence.
Surveys backed by institutional indices and reports on the institutional setting will
suit the purpose of expanding this research to a larger scale.
Regarding practical implications, further research is needed on the effectiveness of
lobbying in commercial diplomacy. The winners of tenders could be approached and
interviewed about the role the commercial diplomats played in their public
procurement contract and how they think this role can be improved. Such research,
instead of focusing on the process of lobbying, would focus on the outcome and
provide suggestions of what makes lobbying successful in commercial diplomacy. A
stream of literature on lobbying identifies several personal characteristics of a lobbyist
that can make lobbying successful. Such research on the personal characteristics of
a commercial diplomat would also contribute to the understanding of successful
lobbying in commercial diplomacy. The literature also suggested that effective
Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats 287lobbying involves knowing what other competitors are lobbying for (and how). The
findings of this study revealed that diplomats often did not know what the other
embassies were organizing. If two embassies organize an event on the same theme
during the same period of time, it might decrease the effectiveness of such events.
Hence, further research is justified to measure the awareness of commercial diplomats
of how other competitors are lobbying.Acknowledgement
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